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The Tax Credits Program for School Choice

Who Would Benefit?

 
 
 

"This proposal could be described as the 'Government Schools Relief Program,' since government schools would have more money to spend per student."

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

"More middle income families would be induced to stay in the cities." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

"The per pupil spending increase in government schools would be higher the greater the number of students switch to private schools."
 
The Tax Credits Program for School Choice offers gains for schools, students, parents, cities, taxpayers, education entrepreneurs and businesses concerned about education.  

BENEFITS FOR GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS. If, as government school officials often claim, more money is the answer to their problems, then tax credits for school choice would help solve those problems for, as shown below, under almost any reasonable scenario government schools would gain. In fact, this proposal could be described as the "Government Schools Relief Program." Since most of the money would remain when pupils leave a government school, per pupil spending on the remaining students would rise. In addition, a smaller enrollment would alleviate the need for larger classes and expanded capital budgets for government schools. 

BENEFITS FOR STUDENTS FROM LOW INCOME FAMILIES. Rather than giving money to government, taxpayers could help children from low-income families achieve a better education. This program would enable all taxpayers to decide where to send the taxes they owe. Although benefactors could receive a tax credit of no more than $1,000 per child, many might contribute more and deduct the contributions as charity on their federal tax returns. 

The $1,000 tax credit likely would allow a large fraction of current government school students to attend nongovernment schools if they chose to do so. The tax credit would not guarantee a Cadillac education for everyone, but it would afford many more students a good-quality Chevy. Even those who chose to stay in government schools would be better off. As noted above, those children would benefit from the increased per pupil spending. 

Contributions to private scholarship programs offering tuition assistance to children of low-income parents also would be eligible for the tax credit. The Children's Educational Opportunity Foundation (CEO America), a nationwide umbrella group of private voucher programs based in Bentonville, Ark., reports that more than 13,500 children from low-income families are in the programs currently in operation in 30 cities, including Washington, D.C., Dallas, Indianapolis, Philadelphia, Atlanta, San Antonio, Oakland and Little Rock. Aid ranges from $3,000 per student in Atlanta to $750 in San Antonio and Oakland.8 In these private voucher programs, the families pay a share of the tuition -- usually about half. Even so, more than 20,000 still in government schools are on waiting lists.9 Of course, many private and religious schools offer tuition assistance to students. 

For every one of these programs, the demand for assistance far exceeds the supply. Tax credits for school choice could expand the supply. 

BENEFITS FOR PARENTS. The program would give parents more options. An important reason why more children do not attend nongovernment schools is financial.10 Many parents cannot afford to pay both taxes and tuition. Tax credits would partially remedy that unfairness. Homeschooling parents would also get tax relief. And unlike voucher proposals that target only children in low-income families, tax credits would benefit all parents. 

Even those who chose to leave their children in government schools would gain influence over the quality of curriculum and teaching there. School officials, keenly aware that the parents had a choice of schools, would be strongly inclined to increase parental satisfaction. 

BENEFITS FOR CITIES. Education tax credits could become an important economic development and neighborhood preservation tool for inner cities. To survive, cities need taxpaying residents and businesses. But because the quality of so many urban schools is so poor, many families leave the cities in search of better schools in the suburbs. That migration in turn affects where businesses locate. The tax credit proposal developed here would induce more middle-income families to stay in the cities and send their children to nongovernment schools if they were dissatisfied with the available government schools. 

BENEFITS FOR TAXPAYERS. This proposal moves students out of high-cost into low-cost schools. Moreover, capital and operating budget pressures due to projected enrollment increases would decrease. The need to build more government schools and to hire more teachers would diminish. In time, as the taxes raised proved more than sufficient to educate children in government schools, elected officials would face pressure to lower tax rates. 

BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION ENTREPRENEURS. People and groups wanting to start new schools likely would find it easier to raise the capital to do so when the new tax credits increased the demand for nongovernment schools. The growth in nongovernment school population would stimulate innovation in the private education market. 

BENEFITS FOR BUSINESSES CONCERNED ABOUT EDUCATION. For the last 15 or 20 years, many businesses have supported school reform efforts through partnerships, loaned executives, donated equipment and outright cash grants. Although those efforts may have improved the education of individual students, government school systems have resisted fundamental reform and remain inefficient. Tax credits would encourage both large and small businesses to make an immediate difference in education -- rather than enduring years of wrangling while school reform legislation is hammered out and charter schools approved. Without delay they could: 

  • Set up schools for their employees' children and others; the schools could even specialize in teaching skills of particular use to the business sponsor. 
  • Use their education tax dollars to pay tuition at existing nongovernment schools they deem worthy of support. 
  • Contribute to private scholarship funds. 
The Program in Action 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

"Twenty-five percent of Philadelphia school children already attend nongovernment schools." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

"In Philadelphia, per pupil spending would increase if slightly more than 5 percent of students left government schools."
 
How might the Tax Credits Program for School Choice work? Even though the credits, including those for pupils already in nongovernment schools, would be deducted from the appropriate school district's budget, per pupil spending would rise in almost all cases if as few as 5 percent of those now in government schools transferred. This is because no more than $1,000 per pupil would be deducted - far less than the amount now being spent. 

In a few districts, large numbers already attend nongovernment schools. If the full credit were claimed for all those pupils and only a small percentage transferred from government schools, per pupil spending might fall. In those rare instances, the state government could make up any lost revenues. 

This section examines the results in some Pennsylvania districts if 5 percent of pupils transferred from government to nongovernment schools. It also looks at two large districts often cited for the problems of their schools, New York City and Washington, D.C. 

CASE STUDY: THREE PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS. Figure II shows the effects of the program on local school operating budgets in three selected districts in Pennsylvania. [Details of the calculations are in Appendix Table I.] If 5 percent of government school students moved to nongovernment schools and all current nongovernment school students claimed the full tax credit: 

  • Per pupil spending for government schools in Erie, a low-income district, would increase by 2.5 percent without increasing total spending. 
  • In Abington, a suburban district, per pupil spending would increase 0.2 percent. 
  • In Wellsboro, a rural district, per pupil spending would increase 1.8 percent. 
The per pupil spending increase would be higher still if more than 5 percent left for nongovernment schools. 

CASE STUDY: PHILADELPHIA. Philadelphia is probably one of the few exceptions in Pennsylvania. There, slightly more than 5 percent would have to leave government schools to increase per pupil spending. Because of parental dissatisfaction with troubled government schools, 25 percent of schoolchildren in the Philadelphia school district already attend nongovernment schools. As Figure III shows: 

  • If only 5 percent of the 211,658 students in government schools moved to nongovernment schools and all nongovernment students claimed the full tax credit, per pupil spending would decrease 1.2 percent, from $6,374 to $6,296. 
  • If 7 percent moved, per pupil spending would increase 0.6 percent, from $6,374 to $6,410. 
It seems likely that at least 7 percent of current government school students would leave if credits were available. If more did so, per pupil spending for children remaining in Philadelphia's government schools would rise further: 
  • If 10 percent of the students in the Philadelphia government schools left, per pupil spending would increase by more than 3 percent. 
  • If 15 percent left, per pupil spending would increase almost 9 percent. 
  • And if 20 percent left, the increase would exceed 14 percent. 
[The calculations for Philadelphia can be found in Appendix Table II.] 

CASE STUDY: OTHER LARGE CITY SCHOOL SYSTEMS. New York City, the nation's largest public school system, and Washington, D.C., arguably the nation's worst, could increase per pupil spending if as few as 5 percent of students moved to nongovernment schools, even if the tax credit were expanded to $1,200. This would be true even if the credit went to the 20 percent of all schoolchildren in New York who are already in nongovernment schools. Only 12 percent are in nongovernment schools in Washington, so per pupil spending in government schools there could go up almost 2 percent if 5 percent of government school students transferred to nongovernment schools. [See the sidebars, "School Tax Credits in New York City" and "School Tax Credits in Washington, D.C."] [Appendix Table III] [Appendix Table IV] 

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