Notes

2 The nation’s other major crime measure " the National Crime Victimization Survey " is based on a representative sample of approximately 49,000 households. It shows a steady decline in both violent and property crime since it began in 1973. While no one has satisfactorily explained the differences between the victimization survey and the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, the two crime measures differ in many respects, including the crimes covered, the reporting populations and so on. Part of the difference, however, is attributable to improved reporting procedures by the police forces across the nation and a gradual increase in the percentage of all crime reported to the police by victims. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 1992, pp. 386-87; U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization 1991, October 1992, p. 4; and U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Crime and the Nation’s Households 1992, August 1993, p. 2. back

3 The Anglo-Saxon legal system is described in Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederick W. Maitland, The History of English Law, vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968 [1895]), 2d ed., pp. 25-63; Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. II (London: Methuen, 1966 [1936]), 4th ed., chapter 2; Bruce Lyon, A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval England (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980), 2d ed., p. 83; and Frederick Seebohm, Tribal Custom in Anglo-Saxon Law (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1972 [1911]). back

4 According to Alfred R. Lindesmith, in primitive societies which do not have central governments capable of exercising coercive control over the subgroups that constitute their society, it would not be logical to speak of either crime or formal punishment. The standard example of this type of society is the Ifugao of Luzon as described by Hoebel. In Ifugao society the kinship groups are sovereign, and most offenses are handled essentially as torts or private wrongs to be settled by restitution, that is, by payments made to the offended party by the offender or his kinship group. See Lindesmith, "Punishment," David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 9 (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 217-22; and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 219-20. back

5 In this period England had not arrived at the distinction between the law of crime and the law of tort. Economic restitution was the major form of punishment for most crimes. A lord or the king sometimes collected additional fines as a form of punitive damages. See Holdsworth, A History of English Law, p. 43. back

6 As Bruce Benson puts it, "In effect, everyone who wanted to participate in and benefit from the social order was bonded," because his kindred had to guarantee his behavior. Revocation of the bond took the form of exile or slavery. See Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1990), p. 23. back

7 Ibid., pp. 21-30. back

8 On occasion, however, a plaintiff who failed to get his cause heard in the jurisdiction of his own "hundred" (tribe) would ask a nobleman or king to intervene. back

9 When accused clerics were tried by ordeal, they were given a dry morsel of consecrated bread. If they could swallow it, they were considered not guilty, but if it stuck in their throat, they were considered guilty. For a brief description of the Anglo-Saxon legal customs, see Encyclopedia Americana, vol. 1 (Danbury, CT: Grolier, 1991), p. 844. back

10 Richard S. Post and Arthur A. Kingsbury, Security Administration: An Introduction to the Protective Services, 4th ed. (Boston: Butterworth-Heineman, 1991), p. 34. back

11 Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State, pp. 62-63. back

12 Juan Cardenas, "The Crime Victim in the Prosecutional Process," Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, vol. 9, Spring 1986, p. 365. back

13 For example, from 1870 to 1885, the five Kansas railheads of Abilene, Caldwell, Dodge City, Ellsworth and Wichita had a total of 45 homicides, an average of three per year. See Robert R. Dykstra, The Cattle Towns (New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 44. back

14 Roger D. McGrath, Gunfighters, Highwaymen and Vigilantes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 247. back

15 For further discussion of this point, see "The War on Gun Ownership Still Goes On! Dial 911 and Die!" Guns & Ammo, July 1992, p. 23, p. 87;

and Morgan O. Reynolds and W.W. Caruth III, "Myths about Gun Control," NCPA Policy Report No. 176, National Center for Policy Analysis, December 1992, pp. 25-27. back

16 South v. Maryland, 1856. back

17 Bowers v. DeVito, U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 686F.2d 616 [1982]. back

18 New American, April 20, 1992, p. 16. back

19 William C. Cunningham, John J. Strauchs and Clifford W. Van Meter, Private Security Trends, 1970 to 2000: The Hallcrest Report II (Boston: Butterworth-Heineman, 1990), p. 176 (hereafter referred as Hallcrest Report II); see also Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1993, p. B1. back

20 Hallcrest Report II, p. 175. back

21 Robert McCrie, publisher of the semimonthly Security Letter, quoted in the Wall Street Journal, June 22, 1993, p. A17. Another report claims 25 percent of residences have alarm systems. back

22 Ira A. Lipman, president of Guardsmark, the nation’s fifth largest private security company, expansively says, "What’s going on in this country is private security has replaced the police." See Ralph Blumenthal, "As the Number of Private Guards Grows, Police Learn to Enlist Their Help," New York Times, July 13, 1993. George Shollenberger, an expert on law enforcement trends at the National Institute of Justice, says, "The essential conclusion is that the [public] police can’t do it alone any more." Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1993, p. B1. back

23 See Morgan O. Reynolds, Crime by Choice (Dallas: Fisher Institute, 1985), p. 101 back

24 Blumenthal, "As the Number of Private Guards Grows, Police Learn to Enlist Their Help." back

25 Ibid.back

26 For example, see Douglas T. Cohen, Cox News Service, "Bad Cops Hard to Get Off Street," Houston Chronicle, June 20, 1993, p. 6C. back

27 George L. Kelling, "What Works - Research and the Police," Crime File Study Guide (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1988). back

28 Author’s telephone interview with Patrick Cannan, director of corporate relations, Wackenhut Services, Inc., July 14, 1993. back

29 Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1993, p. B1. back

30 Ibid. back

31 Hallcrest Report II. back

32 Author’s communication with New York City Police, Community Affairs Department, February 23, 1994. back

33 Cunningham, Strauchs and Van Meter, Private Security Trends, p. 280. back

34 Kansas City Star, October 22, 1990, p. D3. Vince McInerny, a spokesman for the police department, said in a telephone interview in November 1993 that the only contracting out ever done was for some school crossing guards. back

35 William C. Wooldridge observes that the railroad police developed "an expertise not realistically within the grasp of public forces." William C. Wooldridge, Uncle Sam, the Monopoly Man (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1970), p. 117. back

36 U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1990, NCJ-134124, February 1992, p. 8. Also see "Crime and the Nation’s Households, 1992," Bulletin, August 1993. back

37 FBI, Crime in the United States, 1992. back

38 James S. Kakalik and Sorrel Wildhorn, The Private Police Industry: Its Nature and Extent (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1971), pp. 112-13; and Benson, The Enterprise of Law, p. 263. back

39 This section is based on interviews with Richard B. Weinblatt, president of the Center for Reserve Law Enforcement, and Bill Martin of the International Reserve Law Officers Association. back

40 Reynolds, Crime by Choice, pp. 96-97. back

41 It would be important to establish a new, lower baseline each year geared to reductions in crime. Otherwise, the incentive scheme would be self-defeating once the police department had earned the highest allowable pay increases. back

42 John Carlisle, "Criminal Welfare: A Jail Reduction Failure," Policy Insights, April 1992, No. 406, Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, Washington, DC, pp. 1-2. back

43 Author’s interview, February 19, 1993. back

44 Carlisle, "Criminal Welfare: A Jail Reduction Failure." According to Bob Burton, bounty hunter and author of Bounty Hunter (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1984) and Bail Enforcer: The Advanced Bounty Hunter (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1990), five out of six who skip private bail get picked up. back

45 Jane Marino Reed and Rhonda Sue Stallings, "Bounty Hunting: The Alternative Justice System," publication of the Professional Bail Agents of the United States, Houston, Texas, August 1992, p. 5.back

46 Calculated from U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, "Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants, 1990," NCJ-139560, November 1992, p. 9. back

47 Taylor v. Taintor, 83 US (16 Wall.) 366 (1873). back

48 Quoted in New York City Police Department, Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Legal Matters, Legal Bureau Bulletin, 1991. See Reed and Stallings, "Bounty Hunting." back

49 Author’s interview, February 19, 1993 back

50 See Carlisle, "Criminal Welfare: A Jail Reduction Failure;" U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, "Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants, 1990;" and Martin D. Sorin, Out on Bail (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, 1986). back

51 Ibid. back

52 Reed and Stallings, "Bounty Hunting." back

53 John Burns, a private bondsman from Texas, contrasted the two types of bail when he spoke before the Association of (public) Pre-Trial Services Agencies in 1985.

"Really," Burns said, "there are very few differences between public bail and private bail, in spite of the fact that I am the only free enterprise bail agent in this room. Let me give you an example. Would all of you please hold up your hand when you agree that you do similar things that I do?" "How many here interview and get people out of jail? Please hold up your hand." Every hand in the room, including Burns’, went up. "How many here pay for their house notes, their groceries and so on because of the work we do?" Again, every hand, including Burns’, was raised.
"How many of you go out if the man does not show up for court, find the man and bring him to court or are personally responsible to pay the bond if it forfeits?" Burns’ was the only hand raised.
He looked at the crowd and said, "You see, the only difference is that we (the private bondsmen) are responsible." Then he sat down. Recounted in Gerald Monks, "Public Bail & A National Disaster," ch. 8 in Patrick B. McGuigan and Jon S. Pascale, eds., Crime and Punishment in Modern America (Washington, DC: Free Congress Resource and Educational Foundation, 1986). back

54 "No Body, No Booty," interview with Bob Burton, Paladin Press Magazine, June 1993, pp. 28-29. See also Bob Burton, Bounty Hunter (Boulder,CO: Paladin Press, 1984) and Bob Burton, Bail Enforcer. back

55 Remarks before the Professional Bail Agents of the United States National Convention, Las Vegas, February 8, 1993. back

56 Another problem is that information provided by an arrested person during the PTR interview has often been passed on to the state. Some claim that this practice compromises the civil right of the accused against self-incrimination. See David Mitcham, "Free Bond-Free Lawyer Bondsmen Reconsidered," Docket Call, official magazine of the Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association, March/April 1989. back

57 David Villano, "Get Out of Jail Free," New Times, July 1991. back

58 See Stephen Labaton, "Now Bounty Hunters Can Make Out Like Bandits," New York Times, October 17, 1993, p. 4E. back

59 Dallas Morning News, July 24, 1993, p. 1A. back

60 Author’s telephone interview with Sharon Greene, assistant producer, February 9, 1994. back

61 Author’s communication with Crime Stoppers International, Inc. back

62 Steven Long, "Team Has Horse Thieves Running Scared," Houston Chronicle, March 2, 1993, p. 18A. back

63 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 1992, and Statistical Abstract of the United States 1993 (Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993), pp. 199, 214. back

64 A.M. Best Company, Inc., Best’s Aggregates & Averages, annual. back

65 FBI, Crime in the United States, 1992, p. 205. back

66 Also see Richard Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992), pp. 597-98. back

67 Later, however, the enforcer (or anyone alse) can blackmail the criminal in exchange for not prosecuting, presenting a continuing problem for the criminal. back

68 No city exceeds New York City in the exposure of massive police corruption each generation. Because of the large fixed monthly levies received by each police officer in the 1880s and 1890s, the Lexow Committee found that police jobs and promotions had to be purchased from those in power. Appointments to patrolman cost $300 and a promotion to "roundsman" cost an equal sum; making sergeant cost $1,600 and captaincy required as much as $15,000. See Carl Sifakis, The Encyclopedia of Crime (New York: Facts on File, 1982), p. 423. The Knapp Commission (1970-72) found that building contractors added 5 percent to construction costs for bribes to police (Sifakis, p. 402). back

69 Cohen, "Bad Cops Hard to Get Off Streets." See also the open letter of January 10, 1994, to President Clinton asking him to appoint a national commission to investigate the widespread abuses of civil liberties by federal law enforcement agencies (53 separate federal agencies have the authority to make arrests and carry firearms), including the disastrous siege of the Branch Davidian compound at Waco, Texas. The letter was signed by officials of 10 organizations, including Ira Glasser of the American Civil Liberties Union, Arnold S. Trebach of the Drug Policy Foundation, James J. Baker of the National Rifle Association and Alan Gottlieb of the Second Amendment Foundation, and made public by the ACLU. back

70 For example, an executive for the Association of General Contractors said, "Some contractors routinely add 5 percent to their estimates to cover the costs of internal and external theft." Quoted in Hallcrest II, p. 300. back

71 For a discussion, see Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning, "Private Security: Implications for Social Control," Social Problems, vol. 30, no. 5, June 1983, pp. 503-04. back

72 Hallcrest II, pp. 299-300. back

73 "Victim’s Son Gets Manson Royalties," Associated Press story, New York Times, December 26, 1993. back

74 Anne Belli Gesalman, "Slaying Victim’s Family Gets $6 Million in Damages," Dallas Morning News, June 18, 1993, p. 31A. back

75 Ibid. back

76 In a survey of more than 1,000 Texas felons in 1988, Ben Crouch, professor of sociology at Texas A&M University, found that 740 had court-appointed attorneys and 280 had private attorneys to defend them. The district attorney of Brazos County, Texas, said that 85 to 90 percent of defendants had court-appointed attorneys. Author’s telephone interview, April 13, 1993. back

77 Cardenas, "The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process," pp. 357-98; French example pp. 384-86. back

78 "Prosecution: Comparative Aspects,-"in S. Kadish, ed., Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, 1303, cited by Cardenas, p. 385. back

79 "The Civil Action for Damages in French Criminal Procedure," 39 Tul. L. Rev., 698 (1965), cited by Cardenas, p. 386. back

80 One obstacle is the unwillingness of civil courts to administer damages more complicated than lump sum money payments. The liberties of private bondsmen to recover bail jumpers under criminal law could be extended to bonding arrangements for civil restitution. back

81 Imprisoning debtors was an English custom readily imported into the American colonies; debtors once were sold into service for limited lengths of time in order to pay off debt. Reformers eventually achieved an absolute and total ban on jailing debtors when Florida became the last state to forbid imprisonment for simple debt in 1868. See Sifakis, The Encyclopedia of Crime, pp. 200-01. back

82 While their mechanisms were not identical to financing private civil suits against criminals, private associations were formed in England in the 1760s to prosecute criminals. Prosecution was selective and dues-paying members could refuse to prosecute or could negotiate informal settlements with the accused. Organized “thief takers,- including the Bow Street Runners and the notorious McDaniel gang, operated in response to this system of rewards for securing the conviction of felons in London, but it is not clear whether the thief takers always operated legitimately. Some writers allege that they defrauded the system by integrating thievery and recovery; others claim that what they did was all merely a prelude to public policing. See David Philips and Peter King in Douglas Hay and Francis Snyder, eds., Policing and Prosecution in Britain 1750-1850 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). back

83 Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed., pp. 603. back

84 Prosecutors drop the charges in 25 percent of arrests. About 85 percent of prosecuted cases are plea bargained. See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1992, pp. 483, 527 and 528. back

85 Calculated from U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1992, pp. 483-85. back

86 This idea is not without precedent. However, the author’s local district attorney said he could only remember private preparation of a criminal case (a capital murder case) happening once during a 10-year period. back

87 U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 1991, May 1992. back

88 Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 1990, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, NCJ-141872, May 1993. back

89 The author thanks Gerald Monks of Houston, a former executive director of the Professional Bail Agents of the United States, for suggesting this idea. back

90 Making the Offender Foot the Bill: A Texas Program, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, NCJ-136839, October 1992. back

91 Gary W. Bowman, Simon Hakim and Paul Seidenstat, eds., Privatizing Correctional Institutions (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1993). back

92 For a comparison of the quality of private and public prisons, see Charles H. Logan, "Well Kept: Comparing Quality of Confinement in Private and Public Prisons," in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 83, no. 3, Fall 1992, pp. 577-613. In a comparison of privately and publicly operated corrections facilities in Kentucky and Massachusetts, both staff and inmates generally gave higher ratings to the services and programs at the privately operated facilties, while escape rates were lower and disturbances by inmates were fewer. See Dana C. Joel, "The Privatization of Secure Adult Prisons: Issues and Evidence," in Bowman, Hakim and Seidenstat, eds., Privatizing Correctional Institutions. back

93 Benson, The Enterprise of Law, p. 345. back

94 Private Adult Correctional Facility Census, 5th edition, Private Corrections Project, University of Florida, Gainesville, June 30, 1993. back

95 Corrections Today, December 1992, p. 14. back

96 Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1993, p. B2. back

97 CCA offered to operate the entire prison system for the state of Tennessee in the 1980s but the state government declined the proposal. See Bowman, Hakim and Seidenstat, eds., Privatizing Correctional Institutions, p. 29. back

98 Charles H. Logan, Private Prisons: Cons and Pros (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). back

99 Author’s telephone conversation with CCA Program Director, Houston, TX, July 15, 1993. back

100 Ibid. For the hidden costs of public corrections, see Charles H. Logan and Bill W. McGriff, "Comparing Costs of Public and Private Prisons: A Case Study," National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, no. 216, September/October 1989. back

101 Alexis M. Durham, "The Future of Correctional Privatization: Lessons from the Past," in Bowman, Hakim and Seidenstat, eds., Privatizing Correctional Institutions, p. 39. back

102 Barbara Auerbach, "Federal Government Involvement in Private Sector Partnerships in Prison Industries," in Bowman, Hakim and Seidenstat, eds., Privatizing Correctional Institutions, pp. 91-104. back

103 Bruce Fein and Edwin Meese III, "Have to Fight Crime within Our Limited Means," Houston Chronicle, May 3, 1989, p. 29A. back

104 James K. Stewart, director, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, in a letter to the Wall Street Journal, July 26, 1989. back

105 See Jack Eckerd, - Responsibility, Love and Privatization: A Businessman’s Guide to Criminal Rehabilitation, - Policy

Review 45, Summer 1988, p.52; and Judith Schloegel, “PRIDE of Florida: A Working Model for Inmates, - in Bowman, Hakim and Seidenstat, eds., Privatizing Correctional Institutions, pp. 105-11. PRIDE is an acronym for Prison Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified Enterprises. back

106 Business Week, February 17, 1992, p. 42. back

107 Author’s telephone conversation with Tony Ellis, director of Division of Prison Industries, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Columbia, January 20, 1993. back

108 "Governor Praises Heatron, Zephyr," Leavenworth (Kan.) Times, October 7, 1992, p. A1. back

109 See also Rod Miller, George E. Sexton and Victor J. Jacobsen, "Making Jails Productive," National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, NCJ-132396, October 1991; and "Private Sector Prison Industries" and "Prison-Based Joint Ventures," both by Criminal Justice Associates, Philadelphia, PA, December 7, 1990. back

110 On crime and punishment, see Morgan O. Reynolds, “Why Does Crime Pay? - NCPA Policy Backgrounder No. 123, National Center for Policy Analysis, December 1992. back

This study was funded in part by a grant from Dalfort Aviation.