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NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS HOME / DONATE / ONE LEVEL UP / ABOUT NCPA / CONTACT Why Renewable Energy Is Not Cheap and Not Green |
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| Robert L. Bradley, Jr. | |
Subsidized Conservation, or Negawatts: "Our Dirtiest Resource" |
If the renewable fuel sources considered in this study begin to be rejected for environmental concerns, energy efficiency is left as the "renewable" energy resource of consequence. Conservation as a "supply" of energy has been popularized by many writers, including Daniel Yergin, who in the late 1970s spoke of "conservation energy" as "no less an energy alternative than oil, gas, or nuclear."220 Yergin then argued that a "serious commitment" to conservation in the United States could result in a 30 to 40 percent reduction in energy usage with "the same or a higher standard of living" as a result.221
Pacific Gas & Electric, one of the largest electric utilities in the country, called energy conservation in 1990 the "largest, least costly untapped resource option."222 The California Energy Commission in 1995 estimated that California alone could displace more than 6,800 megawatts of capacity by the year 2005 through energy efficiency.223 Nationally, capacity savings of approximately 11,000 megawatts is expected between 1995 and 1999.224
"Negawatts" (a termed coined by energy conservation guru Amory Lovins to describe the potential of conservation as a resource) in place of megawatts has become a multibillion dollar taxpayer- and ratepayer-subsidized industry. Between 1989 and 1995, the nation's utilities spent an estimated $13.7 billion on ratepayer-subsidized electricity conservation programs (known in the industry as "demand-side management," or DSM). Adding pre-1989 expenditures (DSM programs began as early as the mid-1970s), the total is around $16 billion in today's dollars.225 The U.S. Department of Energy has spent $8 billion to $9 billion out of its total conservation expenditures of $12.4 billion on state and federal electric-usage reductions programs since inception.226
California has led the nation with a $3 billion to $4 billion DSM commitment. PG&E has accounted for over $1.5 billion alone.227 Those massive subsidies, which have been reevaluated as too much too soon,228 have contributed to the state's abnormally high electricity rates and virtually ensures a nonsustainable level of energy conservation investment in the future. The historic "Blue Book" proposal of the California Public Utilities Commission, in fact, substituted a new public-policy goal -- reducing high rates -- for the previous one of lowering total bills through conservation.229
Like wind and solar farms, utility demand-side management programs are susceptible to environmental review from a total fuel-cycle basis. One planner at a major California electricity provider has called DSM "our dirtiest energy source" since gasoline-powered vehicles traverse the countryside to service the thousands of residential and commercial program participants.230 Motor gasoline, in effect, is being substituted for natural gas-fired electricity generation in the provider's service territory.
Energy is also expended to manufacture the new energy-saving appliances marketed by DSM programs, and the disposal of traded-out energy assets (such as refrigerators) is an environmental liability that should be accounted for in the DSM environmental equation.
Environmental tradeoffs aside, economic problems threaten the future of utility-provided, ratepayer-subsidized DSM. The law of diminishing returns suggests that the supply of negawatts is a "depletable" resource. Declining benefit/cost ratios of utility DSM programs are a fact of life in California,231 not to mention other states. The debate is really one about how great the cost savings overestimates have been, not how much cost-effective energy conservation really remains.
Of note are two particularly rigorous studies published by the Illinois Commerce Commission and the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the Department of Energy.232 The former examined the full costs of state DSM-type programs for natural gas from their inception in 1985 through 1994. The commission found no program in which benefits exceeded costs.233 In fact, most programs demonstrated benefits that were only a mere 25 percent of costs.
The latter study examined the total costs and benefits of DSM programs nationwide. The EIA concluded that from 1991 to 1995 approximately $12 billion (nominal) was spent on DSM programs that yielded 215.6 billion kilowatt hours of energy savings. The cost of DSM programs over that period averaged 5.58 cents per kilowatt hour, but fossil fuels produced electricity at 2.35 cents per kilowatt hour. Thus, subsidized energy conservation was twice as expensive as generated power.234
If there was ever an economic honeymoon period for ratepayer-subsidized energy efficiency (most academic and many professional economists doubt that, based on empirical investigation and the pure logic of consumer choice, DSM ever had an efficient phase), those days have passed.235
The impending industry restructuring, which will deliver to the market excess generating capacity and cause rates to fall significantly absent a new round of reregulation, will likely make the "production" of "negawatts" as unnecessary as the construction of new wind, solar, biomass and geothermal capacity, not to mention higher-cost fossil fuel capacity. In fact, increased electricity usage to better utilize underperforming (often gas-fired) power plants will be a key strategy to bring average costs down toward the marginal costs of generation in states like California that are trying to be competitive with other jurisdictions.
The new era of constrained electricity conservation has already begun. Soon after the California Public Utilities Commission's "Blue Book" proposal, two of the nation's and California's largest DSM utilities announced $206 million in DSM cutbacks for the following year (1995). Consumer groups in the state that were signatories to accelerating DSM investments in 1990 testified against further ratepayer cross-subsidies. This coalition put environmental groups in the awkward position of arguing that DSM spending was good for consumers whether their self-styled consumer representatives knew it or not.236 In an article in Environmental Action, David Lapp also noticed
The ongoing restructuring of the electric industry removes the traditional rationales for ratepayer-subsidized conservation. First, the utility's incentive to invest in electricity generation so long as the allowed rate of return is greater than its cost of capital will be removed. In a restructured industry, future generation will compete in an open, competitive market and not be artificially encouraged by automatic cost recovery (or "stranded cost" compensation after the fact).238 Second, flat rates capped at embedded cost - that is, based on depreciated book value of assets under public utility regulation - which in peak periods have failed to regulate consumption, will give way to market pricing in a restructured electric industry. "Real-time pricing" and other "peaking rate" innovations will spontaneously prevent unnecessary consumption and the generation capacity needed to serve it. With the introduction of real-time pricing, interactive computer technologies controlling "smart appliances" and for-profit energy service companies (ESCOs) promise to institutionalize market conservation as an alternative to political conservation in a restructured industry where for-profit opportunities really exist.239
In summary, the market is poised to rationalize the demand-side as well as the supply-side function in place of regulated monopolies. As a Sierra Club representative concluded: "DSM as we have known it cannot function in a reasonably competitive marketplace because DSM is a fix to a flawed regulatory system, which competition is intended to replace."240
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