Notes

²⁵¹ CEC, Policy Report on AB 1890 Renewables Funding, p. 4; Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 1995, July 1996, pp. 245, 281. The California capacities are estimated for 1996; the national capacities are for 1995.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 1994, vol. 2, p. 77; CEC, 1994 Electricity Report, p. 86. These numbers are cumulative through 1994.

²⁵⁶ See generally, Bradley in Michaels, ibid., and Bradley, "California DSM: A Pyrrhic Victory for Energy Efficiency?" pp. 41-47. A sign of the times is that a leading architect of California's central-planning failure with electricity, Ralph Cavanagh of the NRDC, received the 1996 Heinz Award in Public Policy as "the most influential figure in Western energy policy." "Cavanagh Wins Congratulations and Cash for Bringing People Together," California Energy Markets, December 13, 1996, p. 2.

²⁵⁷ The Edison Electric Institute has estimated above-market PURPA related costs at "at least" $38 billion. Statement of Edison Electric Institute, p. 11.

²⁵⁸ California Energy Commission, QF-Self Generation LTBA Database," no date, copy in files (hereafter California Energy Commission QF Database).

²⁵⁹ FERC, "Order on Petitions for Enforcement Action Pursuant to Section 210(h) of PURPA," 70 FERC 61666 at 61667, 61672 (1995).

²⁶⁰ Ibid., at 61676.

²⁶¹ "Order on Requests for Reconsideration," 71 FERC 62074 at 62079.

²⁶² Quoted in Craig Cano, "IPPs Stunned, State Miffed -- Just Another Day on the PURPA Front," Inside F.E.R.C., February 27, 1995, p. 14.

²⁶³ Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook, 1996, p. 36. DOE also mentioned the "further uncertainty" of Congress's proposed elimination of the 1.5 cents per kwh tax credit (ibid.).

²⁶⁴ "NERA Energy Outlook," December 21, 1995, p. 1.

²⁶⁵ See, for example, Arthur O'Donnell, "Edison Files QF Buyout Pact, Seeks Confidentiality of Provisions," California Energy Markets, September 1, 1995, p. 11.

²⁶⁶ The debate over "green" garment labeling brought the following marketing reminder: "It's unclear whether consumers would pay more for garments labeled sweatshop-free, should companies raise prices to maintain better working conditions. The 1980s brought a similar reaction against environmentally unsound products. Companies rushed to make products 'green,' and consumers jumped on the bandwagon to buy them. But as product prices rose, many jumped off again." Wendy Bounds and Hilary Stout, "Sweatshop Pact: Good Fit or Threadbare?" Wall Street Journal (April 10, 1987), p. A2.

²⁶⁷ David Moskovitch, "Green Pricing: Why Not Customer Choice?," The Electricity Journal, October 1993, pp. 42-50; Letter from David Moskovitch to the California Public Utilities Commission, April 27, 1994.

²⁶⁸ For six examples of green pricing programs by investor-owned utilities or public power, see Michael Zucchet, "Renewable Resource Electricity in the Changing Regulatory Environment," Renewable Energy Annual, 1995.

²⁶⁹ Daniel Kaplan, "SCE, Kenetech Announce Wind Power Deal, Green Pricing Plan," The Energy Daily, March 17, 1994, p. 1. Also see Robin Walther, "Green Pricing For Renewable Resource Development: An Idea Whose Time is Coming?" Southern California Edison Company, June 1993.

²⁷⁰ "Our proposal . . . does not require consumers to pay more for generation services provided by renewable service providers. Rather, the price paid is determined through negotiations in the competitive marketplace between the seller and the buyer of `green services'." CPUC, "OIR/OII Governing Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry and Reforming Regulation," April 20, 1994, p. 53.

²⁷¹ Ralph Cavanagh, "Opening Comments of the Natural Resources Defense Council and Comments on Balancing Public Policy Objectives in a Competitive Environment," OII/OIR on Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry and Reforming Regulation, June 7, 1994, p. 12.

²⁷² Edward Holt in early 1997 counted "at least fourteen programs." Holt, "Disclosure and Certification: Truth and Labeling for Electric Power," p. 3.

²⁷³ David Moskovitz et al., "Full Environmental Disclosure for Electricity: Tracking and Reporting Key Information," (Gardiner, MA: The Regulatory Assistance Project, 1997), p. 6, 23.

²⁷⁴ Green pricing for resources that already are part of the utility's portfolio creates a potential double-counting problem. Edward Holt ("Disclosure and Certification: Truth and Labeling for Electric Power," p. 5) calls this "green washing and green scams."

²⁷⁵ "Green Mountain Energy Partners offers predominantly hydro electricity from a partnership with Hydro-Quebec and states that its emissions are 97.5 percent free of greenhouse gases. . . . Hydro-Quebec projects, however, have been criticized for destroying Canada's First Nation (Native American) lands." Edward Holt, "Disclosure and Certification: Truth and Labeling for Electric Power," p. 2.

²⁷⁶ "The implied claim that pumped storage hydro is 100 percent hydropower is probably false, given that pumped storage facilities require energy from other power plants for pumping." David Moskovitz et al., "Full Environmental Disclosure for Electricity: Tracking and Reporting Key Information," p. 4. Adds Edward Holt ("Disclosure and Certification: Truth and Labeling for Electric Power," p. 2), "The company does not mention that the pumped storage may rely on controversial nuclear power to pump the water to the top of the hill."

²⁷⁷ For example, avian mortality is greater at Altamont Pass than Tehachapi Pass. See "CEC Awards Grant Money for Bird Research," California Energy Markets, December 19, 1996, p. 2.

²⁷⁸ Wisconsin Energy's "Energy for Tomorrow" program uses pre-existing surplus hydro and biomass generation to keep the price premium for its 100 percent renewable offering at only around 18 percent. These two resources also allow around-the-clock availability. Conversation with Mike Struebing, Wisconsin Electric, February 6, 1997.

²⁷⁹ "Fuel cells produce practically no pollution, are quiet, highly efficient, and require little maintenance." Business Council for Sustainable Energy, Changing Tide: Tomorrow's Clean Energy - Today, p. 14.

²⁸⁰ See the discussion of product labeling in this paper.

²⁸¹ Edward Holt, "Disclosure and Certification: Truth and Labeling for Electric Power," p. 16.

²⁸² Ibid., p. 14.

²⁸³ The spot electricity can be short term if green pricing is short term and interruptible if the renewables are intermittent.

²⁸⁴ This applies to wind and solar if these intermittent resources are being offered to green purchasers on a firm basis. (Hydro and biomass programs, in contrast, may not need to be "firmed up.")

²⁸⁵ Thirty-year contracts appear to be common. See, for example, two recent contracts by Zond and Northern Alternative Energy reported in Allen Myerson, "Enron Wins Pact to Supply Power from Wind Turbines," New York Times, March 20, 1997, p. C2; "Northern Alternative Energy Signs Two Wind Energy Contracts with NSP," Electric Utility Business, April 7, 1997, p. 9.

²⁸⁶ The resolution is reprinted in David Moskovitz et al., "Full Environmental Disclosure for Electricity: Tracking and Reporting Key Information," p. 27.

²⁸⁷ Edward Holt, "Disclosure and Certification: Truth and Labeling for Electric Power," p. 15. He goes on to state: "Recognizing that there is no natural monopoly in the certification market, an umbrella organization also could be created, a kind of certifier of certifiers." Yet this superarbitrator would create the very natural monopoly that Holt says does not exist.

²⁸⁸ "The mix of one seller depends on the mix of one or more other sellers, so computing the values for the label requires the solution of several simultaneous equations. As the number of participants and transactions between participants grows, the mathematical complexity increases." David Moskovitz et al., "Full Environmental Disclosure for Electricity: Tracking and Reporting Key Information," p. 12. An appendix (p. 28) specifying the "equations for attributing emissions and fuel mix to retail sales" lists twelve variables and five subscripts.

²⁸⁹ See Robert L. Bradley, Jr., Oil, Gas, and Government: The U.S. Experience (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), pp. 687-710.

²⁹⁰ For an overview of the problems of environmental labeling in general, see Julian Morris, "ISO14000: Environmental Regulation by Any Other Name?" Competitive Enterprise Institute, January 1997.

²⁹¹ The repoliticization of electricity is already likely with other aspects of mandatory openaccess. For proposals to completely deregulate electricity, see Jerry Taylor, "Electric Utility Reform: Shock Therapy or Managed Competition," Regulation, No. 3, 1996, pp. 63-76.

²⁹² Staff Report, "The Price is Right," Rural Electrification, December 1996, p. 10.

²⁹³ Quoted in California Energy Markets, June 7, 1991, p. 14. The Energy Foundation, 1995 Annual Report, pp. 1, 17.

²⁹⁴ The case for abolishing the DOE includes two public policy issues not addressed in this essay: renouncing the agency's "energy security" role and privatizing the DOE's power marketing administrations.

²⁹⁵ DOE Task Force Study, p. 3.

²⁹⁶ Ibid. Joseph Romm and Charles Curtis ["Mideast Oil Forever?," p. 74] similarly warn of a diminished federal research and development role with energy and related technologies as "a blunder of . . . potentially historic proportions."

²⁹⁷ DOE Budget Study.

²⁹⁸ Paul Gipe, Wind Energy Comes of Age, p. 90.

²⁹⁹ Public Law 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 at 2795-96, 2803-05.

³⁰⁰ Section 701.3 states: "Until the [CPUC] completes an electric generation procurement methodology that values the environmental and diversity costs associated with various technologies, the [CPUC] shall direct that a specific portion of future electrical generating capacity needed for California be reserved or set aside for renewable resources." Quoted in CEC, 1994 Electricity Report, p. 48.

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