Communities Save Fisheries


Government regulation of the fishing industry hasn't stopped declines in fish populations along the coasts of the United States and Canada, according to a new environmental study. But today, as in the past, some communities have effectively protected their fishing territories and preserved fish populations with minimal government involvement.

Community-based fisheries have been able to avoid the "tragedy of the commons" -- the tendency to overuse publicly owned resources. Many of these operate without government regulation even today; for example:

  • Fishers off Mantinicus Island, Maine, have operated a 77-square-mile lobster fishery for over a century and herring fishing in island coves since the early 1900s, conserving lobsters by limiting the number of traps and fishers by tying open trespassing lobster-trap doors.

  • Port Lameron Harbor, Nova Scotia, has 99 fishers in a mixed fishery, dividing the territory into different sectors for specific kinds of fishing gear.

  • In the coastal waters off Alanya, Turkey, the local fishing cooperative assigns fishing sites by lot at the beginning of the season; then fishermen rotate locations day by day so each has the same chance to reach the stocks of fish.

In some instances, government has supported community-based management -- as in the centuries-old private salmon fisheries in Scotland, fishing cooperatives in Japan and Norway's Lofoten fishery, a self-regulated commercial cod fishery.

According to economist Elinor Ostrom, such management of a commons is possible in communities with a strong tradition, and in the absence of interference by government, when boundaries are well defined, rules are linked to local conditions and sanctions are imposed by other fishers.

The study suggests that these principles and the experience of community management can be applied to many coastal areas and even offshore fishing.

Source: Donald R. Leal, "Community-Run Fisheries: Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons," PERC Policy Series, Issue No. PS-7, September 1996, Political Economy Research Center, 502 S. 19th Avenue, Suite 211, Bozeman, MT 59715, (406) 587-9591.


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