Opinion: Exclusionary Rule Frees Criminals


The controversial exclusionary rule, developed by the Supreme Court in the days of Chief Justice Earl Warren, is coming under renewed attack. The rule holds that evidence improperly seized cannot be considered in criminal trials. The way the rule is currently being applied in some cases has legal scholars up in arms -- and shaking their heads in disbelief.

Consider some recent cases in New York:

  • Four state appellate judges upheld a family court judge's ruling that a loaded .45 caliber semi-automatic gun confiscated by a security guard from a 15-year old student -- when he clearly saw the outline of the gun through a coat -- was improperly seized and, thus, could not be considered as evidence.

  • A human corpse in the trunk of a car could not be used as evidence, according to an appeals court decision, even though the motorist had given permission to two state troopers to search the car -- because state troopers might have appeared intimidating to the driver.

  • A district court judge threw out a case against a convicted felon whom police found driving a taxi and toting a gun -- because the officers "had no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the taxicab," since they "were not able to stop all such cabs."

Ignored by the judges in the last case was the fact that the officers were part of a task force conducting safety checks on cabs in crime-prone areas. This program has been credited with cutting crimes against taxi drivers by two-thirds since 1993.

Critics are urging Congress to rein in the excesses of the judiciary -- starting with a serious review of the exclusionary rule.

Source: Max Boot, "The Exoneration Rule," Wall Street Journal, February 4, 1997.


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