Trade

The Anticompetitive Effects Of "Antidumping" Actions

Many economists and students of regulatory affairs see U.S. antidumping laws as no more than protectionism masquerading as a rational trade policy. To accept the concept of antidumping, one has to accept the premise that there is such a thing as an "unfair price," one that is too low. Such a contention arouses deep-seated skepticism in consumer advocates and serious economists alike.

Antidumping actions work something like this: seeking to protect themselves from foreign competitors, members of an industry will approach the federal government, complaining that foreign producers are selling a particular product below cost, or that the costs of making the product are subsidized by the foreign producers' government. If trade officials in Washington agree, they will impose a duty tax on imports of the product, in order to bring the U.S. sales price up to or above the price charged by U.S. manufacturers.

Critics say it's a practice contrary to the interests of consumers and free competition.

  • Several years ago, the Congressional Budget Office concluded after several years of study that U.S. antidumping law "constitutes protection of domestic industries from foreign competition without regard for the fairness of that competition or for the economic welfare of the country."

  • According to a subsequent CBO study released earlier this year, the U.S. has 294 anti-dumping orders in place -- more than twice that of any other country.

  • Moreover, it found that U.S. antidumping duties are on average the world's highest and are imposed for the longest periods.

  • Most importantly, the CBO found that the high number of U.S. antidumping actions could not be explained either as a function of the volume of U.S. imports or the U.S. gross domestic product when compared to the antidumping actions and import/GDP performance of U.S. trading partners.

All of this did not stop the U.S. Trade Representative recently from trying to block the World Trade Organization from discussing the anticompetitive effects of antidumping actions.

The U.S. International Trade Commission has estimated that removal of antidumping and countervailing duty orders in 1991 would have resulted in a net increase in the U.S. GDP of $1.59 billion that year.

Source: Matthew P. McCullough (Law firm of Willkie Farr & Gallagher), "Protectionism by Any Other Name," Washington Times, September 18, 1998.  



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