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The Anticompetitive Effects Of "Antidumping" Actions |
Many economists and students of regulatory affairs see U.S. antidumping laws as no more than protectionism masquerading as a rational trade policy. To accept the concept of antidumping, one has to accept the premise that there is such a thing as an "unfair price," one that is too low. Such a contention arouses deep-seated skepticism in consumer advocates and serious economists alike. Antidumping actions work something like this: seeking to protect themselves from foreign competitors, members of an industry will approach the federal government, complaining that foreign producers are selling a particular product below cost, or that the costs of making the product are subsidized by the foreign producers' government. If trade officials in Washington agree, they will impose a duty tax on imports of the product, in order to bring the U.S. sales price up to or above the price charged by U.S. manufacturers. Critics say it's a practice contrary to the interests of consumers and free competition.
All of this did not stop the U.S. Trade Representative recently from trying to block the World Trade Organization from discussing the anticompetitive effects of antidumping actions. The U.S. International Trade Commission has estimated that removal of antidumping and countervailing duty orders in 1991 would have resulted in a net increase in the U.S. GDP of $1.59 billion that year. Source: Matthew P. McCullough (Law firm of Willkie Farr & Gallagher), "Protectionism by Any Other Name," Washington Times, September 18, 1998. |