Opinion Editorial | |
| Wednesday, July 1, 1998 | |
An Alternative to the Line-Item Veto |
Last week, the Supreme Court declared the line-item veto unconstitutional. The line-item veto was enacted by the Republican Congress and took effect on January 1, 1997. It gave the president power to cancel individual spending provisions in appropriations bills without having to veto the entire legislation. The Court said this was an unconstitutional expansion of presidential power that Congress could not delegate. Thus for now, President Bill Clinton will have to veto an entire bill if he objects to any of its provisions. Although opponents of pork barrel spending are dismayed by the line-item veto's demise, in truth it was not a very powerful tool against unnecessary government spending. There is a substantial amount of research based on state experience with the line-item veto that casts considerable doubt on its effectiveness. This is confirmed by the limited extent to which Clinton used his line-item veto authority when he had it. Some 43 governors have line-item veto power, to greater and lesser degrees. Thus there is a large body of data from which to examine the line-item veto's effectiveness. In general, studies based on state experience have found that it mainly affects the composition of spending, but not the overall level of spending. In a typical assessment, economist Douglas Holtz-Eakin wrote, "Examination of the states' behavior suggests that long-run budgetary behavior is not significantly affected by the power of an item veto." A recent review of Clinton's use of the line-item veto by the Congressional Budget Office reached similar conclusions. The study found that he canceled just $355 million in spending for fiscal year 1998 in a budget of almost $1.7 trillion. The cancellations had a material impact on just one appropriations bill. "Last year, the President's cancellations were insignificant compared with the total level of spending and revenues," the report concluded. Nevertheless, there is a case for line-item veto authority even if its impact on total spending is minimal. That is a restoration of the president's power of the purse which was emasculated by the Budget Act of 1974. Prior to enactment of this legislation every president enjoyed a form of line-item veto power called impoundment. In essence, if a president did not think a particular appropriation was justified, he simply did not spend the money. It was exactly as if he had vetoed that line item from the budget. Enraged by President Richard Nixon's effective use of impoundment, a Democratic Congress abolished his authority to impound spending and forced him to sign the legislation in the depths of Watergate. Ever since then, virtually every presidential budget has been declared "dead on arrival," as Congress no longer had to seriously consider the president's budgetary priorities. This has led to a proliferation of earmarks and a redirection of spending away from programs that benefit the nation as a whole toward those that only benefit narrow constituencies. This is bad policy and unfair to the president, who, unlike individual members of Congress, represents all Americans. Ultimately, he is held accountable by voters for managing the budget, but since 1974 he has been denied effective control over it. If Congress still wants the president to have line-item veto authority, the best way of doing so would be to repeal the law restricting impoundment. Not only is this far simpler than other methods under consideration, but it clearly would pass judicial review. As Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in last week's decision, "Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the President to 'decline to spend' any item of spending...there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitutional." Home | Support Us | All Issues | Social Security Debate Central | Contact Us |