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NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS HOME / DONATE / ONE LEVEL UP / ABOUT NCPA / CONTACT The Marriage Penalty |
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| February 9, 1998 | |
Conclusion"A flat tax or national retail sales tax would be a better solution than more tinkering with the Tax Code." |
It is not necessary to completely abandon the family as the basic unit
of taxation in order to eliminate the marriage penalty. It would only require
allowing couples the choice of filing as singles or jointly. This would
preserve marriage bonuses for single-earner couples but eliminate the marriage
penalty for two-earner couples. However, Congress would also have to pass
rules about dividing joint income, such as interest and dividends, and allocating
itemized deductions, such as for mortgage interest and dependents. 38 The major objections to the choice approach are complexity, cost and
abandonment of the principle that couples with the same income should pay
similar taxes. It would be complex because many couples would, in effect,
have to do their taxes twice: first jointly and then as singles to see which
way they would come out ahead. Also, whatever rules are adopted for allocating
joint income and deductions are bound to be complicated. Allowing couples to choose their filing status also would be costly.
According to the CBO, doing so would have reduced federal revenues by $29
billion in 1996. 39 It would also lead to situations in which certain couples
would pay less total taxes than others with the same income. This could
create pressure in future years for further tax measures to redress this
perceived imbalance. Congress certainly needs to be wary about adding additional
complexity to an already overly complicated Tax Code. However, in recent
years Congress has enacted a number of very complicated provisions to the
tax law involving phase-outs for various tax benefits that also have the
effect of worsening the marriage penalty for some couples. For example,
the child tax credit is phased out for couples with incomes over $110,000
and for singles with incomes over $75,000. This means that a couple making
$75,000 each would qualify for the full $500 per child credit if they divorce
but receive nothing if married. 40 Almost any solution to the marriage penalty is likely to increase complexity
and raise questions about cost and fairness. 41 Short of going all the way
to an individual filing system, other options for redressing the marriage
penalty include restoration of the second-earner deduction, such as that
included in the 1981 tax bill, widening tax brackets and modifying provisions
such as the EITC that create marriage penalties. 42 Given the cost of full
elimination of the marriage penalty and budgetary realities, in the end
Congress will probably be forced to choose among these more limited options
if it decides to address the issue at all. A better solution to further tinkering with the Tax Code would be a flat
tax or national retail sales tax. By eliminating progressivity, they get
at the root cause of the marriage penalty. 43 Although there are many other
arguments for a flat tax, this one may prove most persuasive to two-earner
couples. Bruce Bartlett NOTE: Nothing written here should be construed as necessarily reflecting
the views of the National Center for Policy Analysis or as an attempt to
aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. |